Gestão das empresas multinacionais e os conflitos de agência

FELIPE MENDES BORINI, Eduardo Pozzi Lucchesi
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21529/RECADM.20070602007

Abstract

Considering the conceptual framework of the agency theory, this article had a double purpose. Firstly, verify the presence of potential agency conflicts between the headquarter and a sample of 118 subsidiary of foreign multinationals installed in Brazil. The control variables of potential agency conflicts are: communication degree of the subsidiary with the headquarter and autonomy degree of the subsidiary regarding the headquarter. In second place, verify if the subsidiaries that presented potential agency conflicts have a worse financial and strategic performance than the ones that do not presented such conflicts. After cluster analysis procedure, discriminant analysis and Anova, the results showed that regarding the financial performance, the subsidiaries that presented potential agency conflicts have worst performance regarding the sales growth. Regarding the strategic performance, it was verified that the subsidiaries with potential agency conflicts have a worst performance regarding competences and accomplishment development of the goals along years of its operations.

Keywords

agency theory; financial performance; strategic performance; foreign subsidiaries; multinational corporations

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