ROTATIVIDADE DOS EXECUTIVOS E GOVERNANÇA CORPORATIVA NO BRASIL

Charles De Montreuil Carmona
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5329/RECADM.20040301005

Abstract

This work evaluates top executive turnover in function of the property and structure of control in the Brazilian market, which presents low protection for the investors and companies. Also it analyzes the sensitivity of this rotation in relation to the size of the company, yield of the actions and indices Q of Tobin. The hypotheses tested in this work analyze the relation between the executive rotation and the conflicts of potential interests between controllers and administrators. A set of 46 companies listed in the Stock exchange of São Paulo was analyzed during the period of 1997-2000, using the Probit model, It was founded results statistically significant in relation to the causality of the companies in relation to top executives turnover.

 


Keywords

Financial Efficiency; Corporate Governance; Probit Models

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