Padrinhos e caciques: o lado sombrio da atividade política corporativa na captura do Estado

Caio César Coelho, Amon Barros
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21529/RECADM.2021001

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Resumo

Uma das estratégias de não-mercado é a atividade política corporativa (CPA), aa qual engloba as atividades empresariais relacionadas a esfera pública como o lobby, as doações de campanha, as associações de classe e contratos públicos. A conexão entre esfera pública e privada pode trazer alguns benefícios, mas também traz riscos para o ambiente democrático na medida em que pode ensejar uma captura do Estado por parte do setor privado, dando para este acesso ao poder público. Sendo assim, este artigo define o lado sombrio da atividade política corporativa e como ele leva à captura do Estado por meio de estratégias empresariais como a de Caciques e Padrinhos. Para tanto, realiza-se um estudo de caso único e intrínseco, utilizando os dados públicos disponibilizados pelas colaborações premiadas da investigação da Odebrecht na operação Lava Jato. Os dados foram estudados de forma qualitativa por meio da análise de redes temáticas. Esta metodologia permite que se construa teoria a partir de uma descrição rica do caso, o que abre portas para novas pesquisas sobre as possíveis consequências negativas da CPA. Como contribuição, traz-se o lado sombrio da CPA e como o relacionamento pessoal entre Caciques e Padrinhos, incentivados pelas organizações, pode levar a crimes organizacionais e à captura do Estado.


Palavras-chave

atividade política corporativa; corrupção; estratégia de não-mercado; crime organizacional


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